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Abstract—Similar to ballistic tests in which we match a gun to
its bullets, we can identify a given digital camera that acquired an
image under investigation. In this paper, we discuss a method for
identifying whether or not an image was captured by a speciﬁc
digital camera. The method relies on noise residual features
related to the images under investigation. Our approach considers
an “open set” recognition scenario, under which we can not rely
on the assumption of full access to all of the potential source
cameras. This is the only scenario investigators are faced with
in the real world. In this case, we model the decision space to
take advantage of a few known cameras and carve the decision
boundaries to decrease false matches increasing the reliability of
image source attribution as an aid for digital forensics in the
court of law. This approach performs favorably vs. the state-of-
the-art.
Keywords-Digital Forensics; Open Set Recognition; Camera
Attribution; Sensor Fingerprinting.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a way to represent a unique moment in space-time,
digital images are often taken as silent witnesses in the court
of law and are a crucial piece of crime evidence (e.g., in
child pornography, movie piracy cases, or insurance claims).
Verifying a digital image’s integrity and authenticity is an
important task in forensics especially considering that the
images can be digitally modiﬁed easily [1].
The authenticity of an image under investigation can be
enforced by identifying its source. In the same manner that
bullet scratches allow forensic examiners to match a bullet to
a particular gun with reliability high enough to be accepted
in courts, source attribution techniques aim at looking for
“scratches” left in an image by the source camera. These marks
can be caused by factory defects, interaction between device
components and the light, and others [2].
Currently, the forensic community has put some effort
into the identiﬁcation of image sources generated by a
scanner [3, 4], printer [5, 6], or camera [7, 8, 9, 10]. A
simple way to identify an image’s source is by its EXIF header
when available for a format (e.g., JPEG and TIFF), which
contains textual information about the digital camera type and
the conditions under which the image was taken (exposure,
date and time, etc.). In the case of JPEG encoded images,
additional information about the source can be gathered from
the quantization table in the JPEG header. However, we cannot
rely on such EXIF headers because their information can be
easily destroyed or replaced [1].
Ruling out the EXIF headers, the problem of digital image
source attribution may still be approached in other ways. Some
approaches have the objective of identifying the brand/model
of the source camera [11, 12]. For this, approaches generally
analyze color interpolation algorithms. Nevertheless, many
camera brands/models use components by only a few factories,
and the color interpolation algorithm is the same (or similar)
among different models of the same brand [1, 2].
Most source attribution approaches aim at identifying the
speciﬁc camera, not just the make and model that generated
an image. This generally can be done by analyzing image
artifacts caused by factoring defects. Methods based on sensor
pattern noise (SPN) have drawn positive attention from the
forensic community due to the fact that they can identify not
only camera models of the same make, but also individual
instances of the same model. The deterministic component of
SPN is caused by many factors such as imperfections during
the sensor manufacturing process, different sensitivity of pixels
with respect to light due to the inhomogeneity of silicon
wafers, variable sensitivity of each sensel to light, and the
uniqueness of manufacturing imperfections that even sensors
of the same model would possess. These factors make SPN a
robust ﬁngerprint for identifying and linking source cameras
and verifying the integrity of images [1, 2, 9].
Although previous approaches have been effective for image
source attribution, many of them were investigated in a
Closed Set scenario, with the assumption that an image under
investigation was generated by one of n known cameras
available during training. Unfortunately, we cannot always
be sure that an image was generated by one of the cameras
under investigation. Hence, it is important to model the source
camera attribution problem in an Open Set scenario, in which
we only have access to a limited set of suspect cameras. An
Open Set scenario mimics a realistic situation much better than
a Closed Set one. We need a classiﬁcation model according
to the few available classes while trying to take the unknown
variables into consideration.
Contributions:
• We discuss our technique to match an image to its speciﬁc
source by using SPN features in an Open Set scenario,
in which we have access to a limited set of cameras for
training, and an image can be generated by any camera,
including cameras to which we never had access.
• We account for the unknown cameras by optimizing
the decision boundary hyperplane found by a traditionalSupport Vector Machine (SVM) classiﬁer and minimizing
the training data error associated with it.
• In addition, we also have a minor contribution in the
feature characterization part of the problem since we
extend upon Lukas et al.’s approach [9] based on SPN
source camera attribution.
To our knowledge, this is a ﬁrst step towards robust source
camera attribution approaches, analyzing images with different
resolutions and acquisition conditions with high classiﬁcation
results through machine learning techniques.
Finally, we organized this paper in ﬁve sections: Section II
presents some related work about camera source attribution.
Section III shows details about the Open Set recognition
problem. Section IV presents our approach for the problem
of source attribution. Section V presents the experiments and
results of this work.
II. FORENSIC RELATED WORK
For speciﬁc device source attribution, we aim at identifying
the exact camera that produced the image in question. It can
be done considering hardware and component imperfections,
effects of operational conditions, environment, noise, sensor
dust on lens, etc. It is important to observe that these features
may be temporal by nature, and thus, not reliable in certain
circumstances [1].
There is some previous work that analyzes device defects
for image source identiﬁcation. Kurosawa et al. [7] propose an
approach to identify an image’s source by using ﬁxed pattern
noise (FPN). FPN is caused by dark currents, which refers
to the accumulation of electrons in each sensel of the device
due to thermal action. The approach proposed in [7] is limited
because not all cameras have these defects. Furthermore, this
kind of noise is not robust and can be destroyed when the ﬁnal
image is being generated, considering modern cameras.
The approach proposed by Geradts et al. [13] aims at
identifying the speciﬁc camera that generated one image by
analyzing pixel defects. The authors considered hot pixels
(individual pixels on the sensors with higher than normal
charge leakage), cold pixels (pixels with lower than normal
charge) and pixel traps (clusters of hot or cold pixels). The
authors did not report quantitative results about the approach’s
effectiveness. The major problem of this technique is the
fact that some cameras do not contain any defects and other
cameras eliminate defective pixels by post-processing their
images on-board.
Dirik et al. [8] proposed a method that analyzed artifacts
caused by dust on the lens at the time the image was taken.
The authors consider that the dust on the lens generates a
pattern of artifacts that can be extracted from images. They
report visual results, considering a scenario with two different
cameras. However, this approach is also limited, because these
artifacts are temporal by nature and can be easily destroyed
(the lens may be cleaned, for instance).
Approaches based on sensor pattern noise (SPN) for image
source attribution have drawn positive attention from the
forensic community due to the fact that they are a robust way
to identify the speciﬁc camera, including individual instances
of the same model, and not just the brand/model of the
device. As Fig. 1 shows, we can consider two types of noise
patterns: Fixed Pattern Noise (FPN) and Photo Response Non-
Uniformity Noise (PRNU). FPN is caused by dark currents, as
discussed by Kurosawa et al. [7]. The PRNU is divided into
low-frequency defects noise (LFD) and pixel non-uniformity
noise (PNU). LFD is usually caused by light refraction on
particles near the camera and zoom conﬁgurations. This kind
of noise is not considered for camera attribution because of
its unstable nature. PNU is caused by the interaction between
the light and each sensel of the sensor array.
Fig. 1. Sensor pattern noise hierarchy [1].
Lukas et al. [9] have proposed an approach to identify
the speciﬁc source of one image using PNU. The authors
formulate the problem as a detection of the camera sensor
pattern noise. The approach works as follows: for each image
Ij contained in a set of images K, calculate the residual noise
RIj using a ﬁlter F based on the Discrete Wavelet Transform
(DWT) [14].
RIj = Ij   F(Ij) (1)
Then, they calculate the reference pattern Pc of sensor pattern
noise as the average of residual noise of the set. The residual
noise is used in this step to reduce the inﬂuence of scene
details.
Pc =
1
k
k X
i=1
RIi, where k = |K|. (2)
Finally, they calculate the correlation value ⇢c between the
residual noise RJ of one image J under investigation and the
SPN Pc of a set of images of a given camera.
⇢c(J)=corr(RJ,P c)=
(RJ   ¯ RJ).(Pc   ¯ Pc)
||RJ   ¯ RJ||.||Pc   ¯ Pc||
, (3)
where the bar above the symbol denotes a mean value. A
threshold T is calculated using the Neyman-Pearson approach
to minimize the false rejection rate (FRR) while imposing
a bound on the false acceptance rate (FAR). If the value
of this correlation is higher than T, the authors consider
that the suspect image was generated by the camera under
investigation. High accuracy rates were reported in [9] while
testing with nine cameras, and the results are conﬁrmed in
[15, 16]. Fig. 2 depicts a representation of Lukas et al.’s [9]
approach.Fig. 2. Lukas et al. [9] approach.
Li [10] proposed an enhancement for the method of Lukas
et. al. [9]. The author examined the inﬂuence of scene details
in the reference pattern noise. According to the author, the
high frequencies (e.g., object edges) existing in an image can
contaminate its PRNU component, and lead to unsatisfactory
camera identiﬁcation results through sensor pattern noise. The
author proposed a sensor pattern noise enhancement method
to reduce the inﬂuence of the scene content in the noise
component. Considering one image Ip 2 I, after extracting
its noise n = RIp according to Eq. 1, the authors applied a
normalization in each pixel n(x,y), generating the enhanced
noise ne(x,y). The model which yielded the best results is
deﬁned by
ne(x,y)=
⇢
e 0.5n2(x,y)/↵2
, if 0  n2(x,y);
 e 0.5n2(x,y)/↵2
, otherwise;
(4)
where ↵ is deﬁned by the user. The best value reported in
that work for this normalization is ↵ =7 . Fig. 3 shows the
original image (a), its sensor pattern noise (b) and its enhanced
sensor pattern noise (c). The author reports accuracy of 94%
in a scenario with six cameras, considering a center 512⇥512
region of the image.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 3. (a) An input image. (b) Its noise residual calculated as in [9]. (c)
Noise residual enhancement calculated as in Li’s work [10].
The approach presented by Lukas et al. [9] and its
enhancement proposed by Li [10] allowed the development of
other approaches based on their concepts, as approaches that
aim at identifying the common source of image pairs [17] or
clustering of image sets [18, 19]. Considering source camera
identiﬁcation by sensor noise, there are some approaches
whose objective is to discover inconsistencies in camera
identiﬁcation methods and explore how these inconsistencies
can make the source camera identiﬁcation task difﬁcult [20,
21]. These approaches are called counter-forensic techniques,
and are also important in a forensic research ﬁeld because they
can help improve the resilience of existing forensic methods.
However, we do not consider the existence of counter-forensic
techniques in the present work.
Although the approaches presented in [9] and [10] are
effective for source camera attribution, it is important to note
that, for estimating the threshold T, the authors assumed they
had examples from all the cameras, and have subsequently
labelled the entire space in a binary fashion as either positive
(generated by the camera under investigation) or negative
(otherwise). Considering that T is linear, this approach may
not be so effective if we need to analyze images generated
by an unknown camera at training time. When we do not
have access to all cameras in an investigation, we believe (and
give evidence supporting our belief) that machine learning
techniques are better suited to calculate a hyperplane to
separate the positive and negative classes in such a scenario,
and that is the main subject of this paper.
III. OPEN SET CLASSIFICATION AND RELATED WORK
A Closed Set scenario assumes that the camera that
generated the image under investigation is among the set of
cameras available during training. The Open Set approach,
on the other hand, does not assume that the image under
investigation was generated by an available camera. Some
available cameras are considered, but not all images come
from these cameras, thereby optimizing the solution for the
unknowns as well as the known. The important difference
is that all positive examples are similar, but each negative
example has its own particularities [22]. Fig. 4 depicts an
example of Open Set classiﬁcation.
In machine learning, most of the time we do not need, do
not have access to, or do not know all possible classes to
consider. For instance, when classifying whether or not an
image contains a hidden message [1] we might have training
examples of only pristine images (with no hidden messages)
and perhaps some images of only one or two algorithms for
hiding messages. A robust classiﬁer must consider all other
possible types algorithms for hiding messages as relevant
features as a negative class. In many cases, to model this
negative class is non-viable or impossible (for instance,
considering all existent algorithms for hiding messages).
Open Set recognition has received only limited treatment
in the pattern recognition literature. For instance, in a study
of face recognition evaluation methods outlined by Phillips
et al. [23], the authors deﬁne a threshold T where all face
identiﬁcations necessarily must be higher than this value to
be considered a match. However, being greater than T is not
sufﬁcient to be considered a match therefore possible unknown
impostors are considered even though the system is not trained
with all possible impostors.
Considering problems with source attribution, Wang et
al. [24] perform the camera model identiﬁcation that generated
one image through Color Filter Array (CFA) coefﬁcients
estimation as is done in [12, 11], and use a combination of two
classiﬁcation approaches: Two-class SVMs (TC-SVM) [25]? 
? 
?  ?  ? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
Fig. 4. Example of Open Set classiﬁcation. In essence, open set recognition
explicitly presumes not all classes are known a priori. The above diagram
shows a known class of interest (“pentagon”), surrounded by other classes
that are not of interest, which can be known (“triangle”, “circle”, “square”),
or unknown (“?”).
and One-class SVMs (OC-SVM) [26]. The second approach
might be considered a solution for Open Set as it uses one-
class classiﬁers. For that, the authors use only two of 17
available cameras for training (one class of interest and one for
outlier deﬁnition, which can be seen as a form of accounting
for the unknown) and all 17 cameras for testing. The work
reported results of approximately 91% correct matches. The
disadvantage of this approach is the fact that, considering
CFA coefﬁcients, we can identify the brand/model of the
camera that generated one image, but we can not identify
the speciﬁc device, considering that different cameras of the
same brand/model probably have the same CFA components.
Their solution is also different than ours given that we propose
a way to automatically ﬁnd a new position for the decision
hyperplane based on minimizing the training data error in the
case of a binary SVM classiﬁer.
Li [18] and Caldelli et al. [19] proposed different approaches
to separate a set of images into clusters according to their
source devices. In both works, the authors consider that they
do not have any information about the cameras that generated
such images. Although they use unsupervised classiﬁcation
for the cluster deﬁnition, in this case, the works do not
consider an Open Set recognition application because the
authors used a Closed Set of cameras for validation, and one
image necessarily was generated by one of the cameras (that
is, they do not consider any unknown class during training).
IV. OUR APPROACH
Our approach for source camera attribution considering an
Open Set scenario works as follows:
A. Deﬁnition of Regions of Interest;
B. Feature Characterization;
C. Source Camera Attribution in an Open Set scenario.
A. Deﬁnition of Regions of Interest
Lukas et al. [9] consider a central region of the image
to determine the source of an image. Li’s [10] approach
is also performed considering a central region and in other
experiments, the whole image. However, Li [10] performed
the experiments in a scenario where the author has six suspect
cameras with the same native resolutions (that is, all the
1 
3 
4  5 
2 
6  7 
8  9 
Fig. 5. Regions of interest of 512 ⇥ 512 pixels each.
images used in those experiments have the same dimensions).
When we have images with different sizes, to consider a
common region of all images (for example, the central region)
may be better for image source camera attribution.
According to [27], different regions of the image can have
different information about the source camera ﬁngerprint. In
our approach for source camera attribution in an Open Set
scenario, we aim at considering many regions of one image
instead of using just the central region as is done in [9] [10].
We take, for each image, nine regions of interest (ROI) of
512 ⇥ 512 pixels according to Fig. 5. For ROIs 1-5 (in the
center), we are assuming that these regions coincide with the
principal axis of the lens and should have more scene details
because amateur photographers usually focus the object of
interest in the center of the lens. These regions tend to have
more scene details and, consequently, may have more noise
information. The ROIs 6-9 (in the periphery of the picture)
are also important because some cameras have effects caused
by vignetting, that is a radial falloff of intensity from the center
of the image, causing a reduction of an image’s brightness or
saturation at the periphery [27, 28].
B. Feature Characterization
As we discussed on Section II, deﬁning a linear threshold
to separate positive and negative samples may be not so
effective if we need to analyze images in an Open Set scenario,
when an image can be generated by an unknown device.
In our approach, we aim at performing the source camera
attribution by machine learning techniques. One contribution
of our approach is the deﬁnition of some features that can well
represent the source camera ﬁngerprint.
For each region shown in Fig. 5, we calculate the noise
pattern as discussed in [9]. Lukas et al. calculate the noise
pattern considering images in gray-scale, but this can be
trivially expanded to other color spaces. In this article, we
calculated the SPN as deﬁned in Eqs. 1 and 2 considering
the channels R (red), G (green) and B (blue), separately. We
also calculated the SPN considering the Y channel (luminance,
from YCbCr color space) which is a combination of R, G and
B channels (as a gray-scale version of the image) [29]. We end
up with 36 reference noise patterns to represent one camera,
where, for each region, we calculated one SPN for each color
channel, as shown in Fig. 6.
It is important to note that this type of region
characterization allows us to compare images with differentDWT  R 
G 
Y 
B 
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G 
Y 
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Fig. 6. Calculating SPN for one region, considering R, G, B and Y color
channels. For each ROI, we extract the noise residuals using DWT-based ﬁlter,
generating one noise residual for each channel. Then, we calculate the average
between noises of the same color channel from many images, generating the
reference noise pattern for each color channel that represents the camera under
investigation. The process comprises the nine marked regions.
resolutions without color interpolation artifacts, and it is not
necessary to do zero-padding, for instance, when comparing
images of different sizes.
For each image, we calculate its noise and form a feature
vector considering the correlation between each ROI of an
image and the corresponding noise pattern for each camera,
according to Eq. 3. With these correlation values we have
36 features for each image, considering one camera, labeling
images taken by the camera under investigation as the positive
class and the remaining available cameras as the negative class.
C. Source Camera Attribution in an Open Set Scenario
The main contribution of this paper is the use of machine
learning techniques to solve the source attribution problem in
an Open Set scenario. To solve our problem, ﬁrst, we ﬁnd
a classiﬁer from the training set of examples considering the
positive and the available negative samples. Formally, given
training data (xi,y i) for i =1...N, with xi 2< d and yi 2
{ 1,1}, we need to learn a classiﬁer f(x) such that
f(xi)=
⇢
  0,y i =+ 1
< 0,y i =  1. (5)
Let X be our training data matrix in which the nth
row of X corresponds to the row vector xT
i . Consider
that the positive training class consists of feature vectors
P = {x
p
1,x
p
2,...xp
npos} and the negative class(es) consists
of N = {xn
1,xn
2,...xn
nneg} where N = npos + nneg is the
total number of training examples.
We can ﬁnd a maximum margin separation hyperplane
wTx+b =0(linear case) or wT (x)+b =0(nonlinear case)
by means of the classical support vector machine classiﬁcation
algorithm [25, 30] which aims at ﬁnding a classiﬁer able to
separate the data points from P and N, where w is the normal
to the hyperplane, b is the bias of the hyperplane such that
x1
x2 b
Camera 1
(Positive of Interest)
Camera 1I
(Only Known Negative Class) dm
i
xi
2
||w||
w
T x + b =  1
w
T x + b =+ 1
w
T x + b =0
w
SVM - Linear Case
Fig. 7. Example of an SVM classiﬁer considering a linear case.
|b|/||w|| is the perpendicular distance from the origin to the
hyperplane, and   is a mapping function from original feature
space to a higher dimensional space by means of the kernel
trick [30].
After ﬁnding a maximum margin separation hyperplane
(classiﬁer f(·)) from the training data points X, we have a
situation as the one depicted (only for the linear case above)
in Fig. 7 in which we have one class of interest as positive
class (consisting of data points from one camera) and only
one negative class (consisting of data points from another
known camera). According to this model, each data point xi
during training is at a distance dm
i to the decision boundary
given the SVM model and can be classiﬁed as of class +1 if
wTxi + b   0 (linear case) and as  1, otherwise.
SVM uses structural risk minimization (SRM) [30] which
is an inductive principle for model selection used for learning
from ﬁnite training data sets to solve the problem of ﬁnding
the maximum margin separation hyperplane. However, it turns
out that SVM can only minimize the risk in this case based
on what it knows from the training data. In the Open Set case,
many more classes can appear as being a negative class which
could damage the operation of the classiﬁer during tests.
Therefore, in this paper we deﬁne a policy of minimizing the
risk for the unknown for the Open Set case by minimizing the
data error D during training after the hyperplane is calculated
by SVM. We deﬁne the data error D as the inverse of the
normalized classiﬁcation accuracy A(X) during training
A(X)=
✓Pnpos
i=1 ✓(pi)
npos +
Pnneg
j=1 !(nj)
nneg
◆
2
(6)
where
✓(pn)=
⇢
1, if f(pi)   0
0, otherwise. (7)
!(kl)=
⇢
1, if f(kj) < 0
0, otherwise. (8)Equation 6 means we analyze the classiﬁcation values of
all training samples to ﬁnd its classiﬁcation accuracy A(X).
Considering the calculated hyperplane in the training step,
we propose to account for unknown classes by moving the
decision hyperplane by a value " inwards the positive class or
outwards in the direction of the negative known class(es). The
rationale is that by moving the plane we can be more strict
to what we know as positive examples and therefore classify
any other “too different” data point as negative or we can be
less strict about what we know with respect to the positive
class and accept more distant data points as possible positive
ones. As a ﬁrst step towards solving the camera attribution
problem in an Open Set scenario, we consider " to move in the
interval given by the most positive example (farthest from the
decision hyperplane) and the most negative example (farthest
from the decision hyperplane). For simpliﬁcation, we might
constrain the interval, as we do in this paper, to be tighter such
as 2 [ 1,1] to do not drastically change the initial hyperplane
found by SVM.
The " value represents a movement on the decision
hyperplane wTx+b+" =0(linear case) or wT (x)+b+" =0
(nonlinear case). Fig. 8 depicts an example for a nonlinear
case.
In this paper, we loosely call this process as Decision
Boundary Carving (DBC). The value of " is deﬁned by
an exhaustive search to minimize the training data error,
which we accomplish by minimizing 1
A(X) and altering
Equations 7 and 8 to:
✓(pn)=
⇢
1, if f(pi)   "
0, otherwise. (9)
!(kl)=
⇢
1, if f(kj) <"
0, otherwise. (10)
Given any data point z during testing, it is classiﬁed as a
positive example if f(z) >" .
V. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
To validate the ideas discussed in this paper, we created
a dataset with 25 digital cameras. Table I shows the
cameras’ details. For each camera, we generated 150
images with different conﬁgurations of light (indoor and
outdoor), zoom and ﬂash1. All images were taken in native
resolution and JPEG quality compression. These images were
randomly separated into ﬁve sets to perform a 5-fold cross-
validation [30]. For each run, we consider three of these sets
to generate the camera sensor pattern noise, one for the SVM
training (considering only images for the available cameras for
training) and the last one for testing (considering images from
all cameras). The process is repeated ﬁve times, changing the
sets.
We use the LibSVM library [31] for SVM classiﬁcation
and only consider the nonlinear case here with a radial basis
function kernel (RBF).
1The dataset will be freely available upon acceptance.
TABLE I
CAMERAS USED IN THE EXPERIMENTS.
Camera Native Resolution
1 Canon PowerShot SX1-LS 3840 ⇥ 2160
2 Kodak EasyShare c743 3072 ⇥ 2304
3 Sony Cybershot DSC-H55 4320 ⇥ 3240
4 Sony Cybershot DSC-S730 2592 ⇥ 1944
5 Sony Cybershot DSC-W50 2816 ⇥ 2112
6 Sony Cybershot DSC-W125 3072 ⇥ 2304
7 Samsung Omnia 2560 ⇥ 1920
8 Apple iPhone 4 (1) 2592 ⇥ 1936
9 Kodak EasyShare M340 3664 ⇥ 2748
10 Sony Cybershot DSC-H20 3648 ⇥ 2736
11 HP PhotoSmart R727 2048 ⇥ 2144
12 Canon EOS 50d 4752 ⇥ 3168
13 Kodak EasyShare Z981 4288 ⇥ 3216
14 Nikon D40 3008 ⇥ 2000
15 Olympus SP570UZ 3968 ⇥ 2976
16 Panasonic Lumix DMC-FZ35 4000 ⇥ 3000
17 Sony Alpha DSLRA 500L 4272 ⇥ 2848
18 Olympus Camedia D395 2048 ⇥ 1536
19 Sony Cybershot DSC-W120 3072 ⇥ 2304
20 Nikon Coolpix S8100 4000 ⇥ 3000
21 Sony Cybershot DSC-W330 4320 ⇥ 3240
22 Apple iPhone 4(2) 2592 ⇥ 1936
23 Canon Powershot A520 1600 ⇥ 1200
24 Apple iPhone 3 1600 ⇥ 1200
25 Samsung Star 2048 ⇥ 1536
After calculating the relative accuracy for each camera
according to
AR =
AP + AN
2
, (11)
which is the number of correct classiﬁcations during testing
for positive (AP) and negative (AN) data points for a
given camera, the average accuracy AM for each camera is
calculated as
AM =
1
z
z X
i=1
Ai
R, (12)
where z =5runs of the cross-validation.
The results we report correspond to the ﬁnal accuracy AccF,
calculated as the average over all cameras
AF =
1
NC
NC X
i=1
Acc
i
M, (13)
where NC is the number of available cameras during training.
We analyze the Open Set image source attribution
considering that we have access to 15, 10, 5 and 2 suspect
cameras, but the images can be generated by any of the 25
cameras shown in Table 1. In these scenarios, we consider
that we never have access to cameras 16–25 except during
testing. In the ﬁrst case, we consider that we have access to
cameras 1–15 which means we train with cameras 1–15 as
suspect cameras but the images under investigation can come
from any of the 25 cameras of Table 1. Two experiments
with 10 cameras were performed (cameras 1–10 and cameras
6–15). The experiments with ﬁve cameras were performed
considering three different combinations of ﬁve cameras (1–
5, 6–10, 11–15). The experiments with two available cameras
were performed with seven different combinations (1–2, 3–4,
and so forth).3 
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Fig. 8. Our Open Set implementation for source camera attribution using Decision Boundary Carving (DBC). (a) shows the calculated separation hyperplane,
considering the blue and green data points as the known positive (1) and negative (2) classes, respectively, and the red data points represent the unknown
classes (3). The orange region represents the distance between the margins of the positive and negative support vectors. (b) shows the DBC over the calculated
hyperplane, represented by the blue region. Note that the process of carving the decision boundary seeks the minimization of the risk of the unknown via
minimizing the data error D which is implemented as the misclassiﬁcation during training (1/A(x)).
To analyze the effectiveness of our implementation for Open
Set source camera attribution, we performed some experiments
with and without this technique. To analyze the importance of
the choice of ROIs shown in Fig. 5, we performed experiments
with our approach considering just the central ROI (ROI #1)
similar to existing techniques in the literature as well as
experiments considering all of the ROIs.
The result, for each case, is the average of the results for
tests considering each combination of cameras. Table II shows
the comparison of the proposed methods to Lukas et al.’s [9]
and Li’s [10] approaches in an Open Set scenario. We refer to
our approach considering only the ROI #1 as T1, with ROI #1
plus the Open Set decision boundary carving solution as T2,
our approach considering all ROIs without DBC as T3 and
the complete solution with all regions plus DBC as T4.
TABLE II
RESULTS (AF ±  , IN (%)) FOR 15, 10, 5, AND 2 AVAILABLE CAMERAS
DURING TRAINING.F OR EXAMPLE, AN OPEN SET WITH 15/25 CAMERAS
CONSISTS OF TRAINING ON 15 CAMERAS BUT TESTING ON IMAGES THAT
CAN COME FROM ANY OF THE 15 CAMERAS AS WELL AS 10 OTHER
UNKNOWN CAMERAS (450 + 300 TEST IMAGES PER ROUND).
Open Set Cameras – Results in Percentage
15 10 5 2
LUKAS ET AL. [9] 94.54 93.93 94.45 93.08
± 2.10 ± 2.09 ± 2.17 ± 2.56
LI. [10] 94.07 93.49 93.94 92.82
± 2.31 ± 2.35 ± 2.35 ± 2.94
OURS – T1 91.01 91.22 93.40 94.16
Only central ROI ± 3.13 ± 2.61 ± 2.58 ± 2.66
OURS – T2 95.57 94.95 95.11 94.34
Central ROI + DBC ± 1.52 ± 1.78 ± 1.62 ± 2.05
OURS – T3 95.89 96.63 95.65 96.43
All ROIs without DBC ± 1.97 ± 1.38 ± 1.76 ± 2.16
OURS – T4 98.10 97.53 96.77 94.49
All ROIs + DBC ± 1.15 ± 0.47 ± 0.89 ± 2.76
Table II shows a statistically signiﬁcant improvement in the
overall performance when comparing the methods we propose
and the baseline of Lukas et al. [9] and Li [10]. It also shows
that it is possible to reliably identify image sources in an Open
Set scenario. The results show that our implementation of the
Open Set by means of Decision Boundary Carving is not worth
employing when we have access to only two suspect cameras,
but it can be useful when we have more suspect cameras.
Furthermore, it is easy to see the improvement in results
when we consider more ROIs for this identiﬁcation. The
approach proposed by Li [10] does not statistically improve
the characterization part (considering the dataset used in this
work).
Table III shows results for the experiments considering
we have two available cameras with the same brand/model
(iPhone 4; cameras 8 and 22), but an image can be generated
by any of the 25 cameras. In this experiment we consider our
approach in all ROIs. The results show the average of ﬁve
tests per camera (5-fold).
TABLE III
RESULTS CONSIDERING CAMERAS WITH SAME BRAND AND MODEL
(APPLE IPHONE 4).
Lukas et al. [9] 94.29 ± 2.20
Li [10] 93.90 ± 2.55
OURS – T3 95.54 ± 0.72
OURS – T4 95.17 ± 1.17
Table III shows that our approach is also effective in
scenarios in which we have cameras of the same brand/model
(in this case an Apple iPhone 4). Interestingly, in this case, the
accounting for unknown via decision boundary carving, does
not provide a result statistically different than the one without
the optimization.
Table IV shows a breakdown for the case with 15 known
cameras and 25 for testing (10 unknown). It shows the true
positives, as well as the true negatives with results in X%
±   (standard deviation), and in raw numbers considering
the average of a 5-fold cross validation protocol. Note that
the proposed method shows higher performance than Lukas
et al.’s [9] and Li’s [10] approaches considerably reducing therisk for the unknown as we can see in the high number of true
negatives (consequently low false positives) with a very low
standard deviation and an increase in the true positives.
TABLE IV
BREAKDOWN FOR THE OPEN SET SETUP WITH 15 CAMERAS FOR
TRAINING AND 25 FOR TESTING.R ESULTS CONSIDERING THE AVERAGE
OF A 5-FOLD CROSS-VALIDATION PROTOCOL.4 5 0+3 0 0TEST IMAGES
PER ROUND.
Lukas et al. [9] Li [10] Ours – T4
TP 92.5% ± 5.15 91.6% ± 5.70 97.9% ± 0.84
(27.75 / 30) (27.48 / 30) (29.37 / 30)
TN 96.5% ± 2.25 96.5% ± 2.41 98.3% ± 0.24
(694.8 / 720) (694.8 / 720) (707.8 / 720)
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we explained that solving the image source
attribution problem in an Open Set scenario is important
because it is closer to a real environment, in which an image
can be taken by any unknown camera unavailable in the seized
set of cameras during an investigation. This is just a ﬁrst
step to robust source camera attribution techniques. With the
approach discussed herein, it is possible to analyze images
with different resolutions. Furthermore, we can identify source
cameras considering complementary characterization methods
taking advantage of all of the potential of machine learning
classiﬁcation techniques.
Expanding upon the work of Lukas et al. [9], our
experiments report high accuracy results. The next step of
this work is tuning the classiﬁcation model for one class
classiﬁcation, in which we train the classiﬁer with a given class
of interest only. This can be useful in an Open Set scenario,
when we have access to only one camera.
Furthermore, this work can be improved to help to
combat against counter-forensic approaches, as presented
in [32]. Future work includes analyzing some counter-forensic
techniques to this work and the application of this technique to
other pattern recognition and vision problems as it is general
enough and we envision other applications for it.
Finally, we believe that efforts like the ones presented
by [9], [10] and the one in this paper will move source
attribution approaches toward meeting the strong standards
of the Daubert trilogy [33] which establishes a high bar for
acceptance of forensic evidence (analog and digital) in courts
in the US and possibly in other countries.
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